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ABSTRACT
Background: Previous studies on the e!ect of healthy aging on 
Theory of Mind (ToM) have produced mixed results. A possible expla-
nation may be that di!erent ToM components and types of inference 
have not systematically been considered. This study examined the 
e!ect of aging on ToM by assessing both "rst and second order 
cognitive and a!ective components within a single task.
Methods: We compared performance of young (M = 18.3y) and older 
adults (M = 61.0y) on the Yoni task. This task allows for a within-subject 
assessment of both "rst and second order cognitive and a!ective ToM.
Results: We observed that older adults had longer reaction times than 
young adults across cognitive and a!ective "rst order items. 
For second order items, this age di!erence was larger for a!ective 
than cognitive items. Results showed no indications that these "nd-
ings could be explained by age di!erences in speed/accuracy trade- 
o!s.
Conclusion: Our "ndings suggest that decision processes underlying 
ToM are slower in older adults on both "rst and second order infer-
ences, but that age di!erences in these processes between cognitive 
and a!ective ToM are selective to second order inferences. We pro-
pose that the observed age di!erences may be associated with cortical 
and mental changes that occur with aging.
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Introduction
Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute independent mental states – such as 
beliefs, emotions, or desires – to oneself and others, and to understand that such states can 
di!er between individuals (Premack & Woodru!, 1978). Typically, two di!erent ToM 
components are distinguished: The cognitive component involves attributions regarding 
cognitive mental states such as beliefs and intentions, while the a!ective component 
involves attributions regarding emotional mental states. Several neurostimulation (e.g., 
Kalbe et al., 2010; Krause, Enticott, Zangen, & Fitzgerald, 2012) and clinical studies (e.g., 
Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007) have demonstrated 
that these components are independent from one another and are associated with di!erent 
underlying neural networks.
While lifespan research on ToM originally focused on its development in children, the last two 
decades has seen an increase in studies focusing on changes in ToM associated with healthy 
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aging. These studies have robustly and widely reported age-related reductions in ToM perfor-
mance across di!erent experimental paradigms (for reviews, see Henry, Phillips, Ru!man, & 
Bailey, 2013; Moran, 2013). However, studies using a within-subject design to distinguish 
between e!ects of healthy aging on cognitive versus a!ective ToM have yielded mixed findings. 
For example, Duval, Piolino, Bejanin, Eustache, and Desgranges (2011) and Rakoczy, Harder- 
Kasten, and Sturm (2012) found that aging had similar e!ects on both components of ToM. In 
contrast, Li et al. (2013) and Wang and Su (2013) observed that aging negatively a!ected the 
cognitive but not the a!ective ToM component. While these studies provide indications – albeit 
contradicting – about the e!ect of aging on the ability to represent one’s own and others’ 
cognitive and emotional mental states, an important caveat is that they used separate tasks with 
di!erent modalities (e.g., verbal vs. non-verbal; static pictures/cartoons vs. dynamic videos) and 
di!erent levels of di"culty (e.g., first vs. second order inferences; see below) to assess cognitive 
and a!ective ToM. These varying methodological aspects and related task-demands may cause 
performance to di!erentially rely on other age-sensitive processes (e.g., working memory), which 
subsequently could contribute to the mixed findings. For instance, the fact that studies reporting 
similar age e!ects on both ToM components used non-verbal tasks (i.e., Duval et al., 2011; 
Rakoczy et al., 2012) whereas studies that found e!ects on cognitive but not a!ective ToM used 
verbal tasks (i.e., Li et al., 2013; Wang & Su, 2013) is in line with prior indications that age e!ects 
on ToM may be more pronounced for visual as compared to verbal tasks (Slessor, Philips, & Bull, 
2007). To eliminate any influence of such factors on the relationship between age and ToM, it is 
imperative that both cognitive and a!ective components are assessed within the same task.
To the best of our knowledge, only a few studies to date have examined the e!ect of 
healthy aging on both cognitive and a!ective ToM within the same task. For instance, 
Fischer, O’Rourke, and Loken Thornton (2017) and Walzak and Loken Thornton (2018) 
used three tasks to assess ToM in a group of young adults and a group of older adults: the 
strange stories task to assess cognitive ToM, the “reading the mind in the eyes” test (RMET) 
to assess a!ective ToM, and the Yoni task to evaluate both cognitive and a!ective ToM. In the 
strange stories task, participants are presented a story and are then asked why the main 
character acted as they did. In the RMET, participants are asked to infer emotional mental 
states from pictures of the eye region of human faces. In the Yoni task, that we will also use 
here, participants are asked to identify to which of four items a cartoon character (“Yoni”) is 
referring, based on verbal and facial cues. Fischer et al. (2017) found that older adults 
performed worse than younger adults on all four ToM indices, suggesting that these age 
di!erences were robust across tasks and components. Similarly, within a group of older 
adults aged 65–89 years, Walzak and Loken Thornton (2018) found that increasing age was 
associated with poorer cognitive and a!ective ToM performance. In another study, Bottiroli, 
Cavallini, Ceccato, Vecchi, and Lecce (2016) used the faux pas test to assess both cognitive 
and a!ective ToM in three groups of young adults (19–27y), young-old adults (60–70y), and 
old-old adults (71–82y). In this test, participants read a series of short stories and have to 
indicate whether a story contains a social ga!e (i.e., a faux pas). Bottiroli et al. (2016) found 
that the young adult group outperformed the other two groups on cognitive ToM, but found 
no e!ects of aging on a!ective ToM. Furthermore, they found that age was significantly 
correlated with cognitive but not a!ective ToM. Finally, Baksh, Abrahams, Auyeung, and 
MacPherson (2018) examined the e!ect of age on both cognitive and a!ective ToM using 
a newly developed paradigm they termed the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT) as 
well as more traditional measures of ToM (i.e., RMET, “reading the mind in films” test, 
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judgment of preference test). While results showed that increasing age was associated with 
poorer performance on both ToM components in the novel ESCoT paradigm, age did not 
significantly correlate with performance on the traditional measures of a!ective ToM.
While these within-subject, within-task investigations thus consistently observed age- 
related performance reductions for the cognitive component of ToM, results for the e!ect 
of aging on the a!ective component were inconsistent and prompt further investigation. We 
propose that these inconsistent findings may relate to the lack of a distinction between first 
versus second order inferences: first order inferences require an individual to have the ability 
to represent another individual’s mental state and compare it with their own, whereas second 
order inferences require an individual to represent two other individuals’ mental states. This 
distinction is relevant given indications from previous work that aging mainly a!ects the 
latter type of inferences (Duval et al., 2011; Moran, 2013). The observation that the studies 
reporting age e!ects on both cognitive and a!ective ToM (i.e., Baskh et al., 2018, ESCoT 
paradigm; Fischer et al. 2017; Walzak & Loken Thornton, 2018) included both inference 
types – yet did not analyze these separately – while the studies reporting age e!ects on 
cognitive but not a!ective ToM only assessed first order inferences (Baksh et al., 2018, 
traditional measures; Bottiroli et al., 2016) further advocates for such a distinction.
The literature discussed above shows that the e!ects of aging on ToM thus have been studied 
in relation to either the component type (cognitive vs. a!ective) or the inference type (first 
vs. second order), yet these factors have not systematically been evaluated in relationship to aging 
within a single experimental task. The present study therefore aimed to 1) replicate previous 
findings that aging is associated with reductions in ToM by assessing both cognitive and a!ective 
components, and moreover 2) extend prior work by investigating whether the e!ect of aging on 
these components is robust across first and second order inferences, by combining both the 
component and order factors within a single task. We had a group of young adults and a group of 
older adults perform the Yoni task (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007), which is a ToM 
task evaluating both first and second order cognitive and a!ective mental states. We hypothe-
sized that aging would be associated with a reduction in cognitive ToM (cf. Bottiroli et al., 2016; 
Fischer et al., 2017) and potentially a!ective ToM performance (cf. Fischer et al., 2017). As age- 
related reductions in ToM performance have been more consistently observed for second order 
than for first order tasks (Duval et al., 2011; Moran, 2013), we additionally expected that age 
di!erences would be particularly evident in second order inferences. Importantly, whereas prior 
studies on aging and ToM using the Yoni task only included the cognitive and a!ective 
conditions, we also included a physical condition to control for inter-individual di!erences in 
processing speed (cf. Adjeroud et al., 2016; Shamay-Tsoory, 2008; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). 
The physical condition has similar attentional and working memory demands to the other 
conditions, but no mentalizing component, and therefore is well-suited as a baseline condition to 
control for age-related declines in processing speed (Salthouse, 1996).
Materials and Methods
Participants
The older adult (OA) group consisted of 18 participants who volunteered to enroll in the 
experiment. According to the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA; Nasreddine et al., 
2005) none of the older adults showed signs of cognitive impairment. Their data were 
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compared with those of the young adult (YA) group consisting of 17 first-year psychology 
students who took part in the study in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. 
Participant demographic characteristics are listed in Table 1. Prior work showed large e!ect 
sizes for age di!erences in both cognitive and a!ective ToM (d = 0.75 and d = 0.86, 
respectively; Fischer et al., 2017). Sample size calculations using G*Power v3.1.9.4 software 
including these e!ect sizes with a one-sided alpha level of 0.05 and statistical power of 0.80 
indicated we required 18–23 participants per age group. Students and older adults were 
tested in our laboratory and in their home, respectively. All participants provided written 
informed consent prior to the study. The study adhered to the general ethical protocol of the 
ethics committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent 
University.
Experimental Task and Procedure
At the start of the experiment, subjects signed the informed consent form and completed 
a demographical questionnaire. The OA group also completed the MoCA. All subjects then 
performed a ToM task called the “Yoni task”, which assesses the ability to infer mental states 
from verbal and facial cues (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). The task has been 
used in previous investigations on cognitive and a!ective ToM in both healthy and clinical 
populations (e.g., Adjeroud et al., 2016; Kalbe et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2016; Krause et al., 
2012; Li et al., 2017; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). In this task, subjects are presented 
a cartoon character named “Yoni” and four colored pictures of faces or objects belonging 
to a single category (e.g., animals, fruits, flowers), one in each corner of the computer 
screen. Participants have to evaluate, based on the available cues, to which of these four 
pictures Yoni is referring. These cues include a sentence that appears at the top of the 
screen, Yoni’s facial expression or eye gaze, and the response options (Figure 1).
There are three conditions, namely a!ective ToM, cognitive ToM, and a physical control 
conditions. Whereas the control condition requires participants to evaluate the cartoon’s 
physical attributes (e.g., “Yoni is close to . . . ”), the cognitive and a!ective ToM items 
require making mental inferences based on the available cues (e.g., cognitive: “Yoni is 
thinking of . . . ”; a!ective: “Yoni loves . . . ”). In second order trials the choice for the correct 
answer additionally requires an understanding of the interaction between Yoni’s and others’ 
mental states (e.g., cognitive: “Yoni is thinking of the fruit that . . . wants”; a!ective “Yoni 
loves the animal that . . . does not love”; physical: “Yoni has the same toy as . . . has”). The 
cognitive and a!ective ToM conditions each consisted of 12 first order trials, 6 second order 
trials with gaze directed toward the correct answer, and 6 second order trials with the gaze 
Table 1. Overview of the demographic characteristics of the YA and OA groups and performance on the 
neuropsychological test by the OA group.
Young adults Older adults
Mean ± SD Range Mean ± SD Range Group di!erence
Age (years) 18.3 ± 0.8 17–21 61.0 ± 3.9 55–69 t(33) = "43.38, p <.001
Gender 3 M/14 F n/a 11 M/7 F n/a !2 = 6.88, p =.009
Education (years) a 12.29 ± 0.8 11–15 12.94 ± 2.8 8–17 t(33)<1, p =.37
MoCA n/a 28.56 ± 1.65 26–30 n/a
aData from two subjects in the OA group were missing. 
MoCA = Montreal Cognitive Assessment
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directed straight ahead. The physical condition consisted of 8 first order and 8 second order 
trials, half of which had directed gaze and half straight gaze. Participants thus completed 64 
trials in total. Trials on which the gaze was directed straight ahead were included to prevent 
subjects from simply responding to the picture that Yoni’s gaze was directed to without 
reading the sentences (cf. Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007).
Participants were instructed to use a computer mouse and click on the correct picture as 
fast as possible. At the beginning of each trial the mouse cursor was automatically relocated 
to the center of the screen, such that mouse movements were always initiated from the same 
central location and movement distance toward each response option was controlled for. 
We used E-Prime software (version 2.0) for stimulus presentation and data registration. The 
software registered on each trial whether the response was correct/incorrect and addition-
ally logged the response time. Participants used a standard computer mouse for responding, 
with the cursor speed set at the 6/11 default mode in Windows 10.
Data Processing and Analysis
As one of the participants in the OA group performed the ToM task at an accuracy of <80% 
(with only 42% correct responses in the second order a!ective condition), data from this 
subject were excluded from further analyses. For the remaining 17 subjects in each age 
group we determined their median RTs and their proportion of correct responses for each 
condition. Trials on which an incorrect answer was given were omitted from the RT 
analyses. In line with previous studies using the Yoni task (e.g., Li et al., 2017; Shamay- 
Tsoory, 2008; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007) we ran mixed analyses of covariance 
(ANCOVAs) for both the first and second order conditions with Component (2; cognitive 
vs. a!ective) as a within-subject variable, Age Group (2; YA vs. OA) as a between-subject 
variable, and performance in the Physical condition as a covariate to control for group 
di!erences in baseline performance. We ran our analyses using both the more traditional 
null-hypothesis significance testing approach (NHST; via SPSS software, version 25.0; IBM 
Corp, 2017) and a Bayesian approach with default prior settings (via JASP software, version 
Figure 1. Examples of items in the first and second order a!ective ToM, cognitive ToM, and physical 
control conditions (color figure online).
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0.11.1; JASP Team, 2020). For the mixed ANCOVAs we report the Bayes Inclusion factor 
based on matched models, which represents the evidence for all models containing 
a particular e!ect to equivalent models without that e!ect (i.e., BFInlcusion, also known as 
Baws factor). For other analyses presented below, such as t-tests and correlation analyses, 




We first performed two independent-samples t-tests on performance in the first and second 
order Physical condition with Age Group as the independent variable to evaluate whether 
the performance in these control conditions di!ered between YA and OA. Results showed 
that there were di!erences for both first order (YA = 1356 vs. OA = 2936) and second order 
control items (YA = 2363 vs. OA = 5749), ts(32)<-6.64, ps<.001, ds<-2.27, BF10s>100, 
justifying the inclusion of performance in the Physical condition as a covariate in our 
analyses.
Figure 2 shows the RTs of YA and OA in the a!ective and cognitive trials as a function of 
order condition.1 Error bars presented in all figures were calculated via the Cousineau- 
Morey method for repeated-measures (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008). For the first order 
condition, results of the ANCOVA showed that YA responded faster than OA (1736 vs. 
3050 ms), F(1,31) = 8.50, p = .007, !p2 = .215, BFInclusion = 29.51. There were no other 
significant main or interaction e!ects (main e!ect of covariate p = .051; all e!ects of Age 
Group and/or Component ps>.30). To verify that the e!ect of Age Group was significant 
within both the a!ective and cognitive components, we performed two univariate 
ANCOVAs. Results confirmed that YA were faster than OA on both the a!ective compo-
nent (1732 vs. 3213 ms), F(1,31) = 7.78, p = .009, !p2 = .201, BFInclusion = 22.45, and the 
cognitive component (1740 vs. 2887), F(1,31) = 7.46, p = .010, !p2 = .194, BFInclusion = 15.27.
For the second order condition, results again showed that YA responded faster than OA 
(3119 vs. 6341 ms), F(1,31) = 11.73, p = .002, !p2 = .274, BFInclusion = 99.27. In addition, we 
Figure 2. Individual median RTs and mean median RTs (adjusted for performance in the physical control 
condition) for the a!ective and cognitive ToM components as a function of age group in the first (left) 
and second (right) order conditions. Error bars represent within-subject standard errors. * p <.05 ** p <.01 
*** p <.001.
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observed that across the two age groups participants responded faster to cognitive com-
pared to a!ective items (4720 vs. 4741 ms), F(1,31) = 8.89, p = .006, !p2 = .223, BFInclusion 
= 0.21. There was a significant Component # Physical condition interaction, F(1,31) = 9.73, 
p = .004, !p2 = .239, BFInclusion = 1.81, and post-hoc correlation analyses showed that 
performance on physical trials was positively related to performance on both a!ective trials, 
r(34) = .69, p < .001, BF10 > 100, and cognitive trials, r(34) = .75, p < .001, BF10 > 100. 
A z-test for evaluating the di!erence between correlation coe"cients (Lee & Preacher, 2013) 
indicated that the strength of the associations did not significantly di!er between the two 
ToM components (z = $1.33, p = .18). Most interestingly, results revealed a significant 
Component # Age Group interaction, F(1,31) = 5.17, p = .030, !p2 = .143, BFInclusion = 0.80. 
Follow-up analyses indicated that YA were faster than OA on both the a!ective component 
(2855 vs. 6626 ms), F(1,31) = 17.23, p < .001, !p2 = .357, BFInclusion>100, and the cognitive 
component (3383 vs. 6057), F(1,31) = 6.73, p = .014, !p2 = .178, BFInclusion = 9.46. The 
interaction in combination with the p-values, BFs, and e!ect sizes of the follow-up analyses 
suggest that age di!erences in RT in ToM are more pronounced for a!ective than cognitive 
mental states.
Accuracy
Figure 3 shows the response accuracy in each age group for the a!ective and cognitive ToM 
components in the first- and second-order conditions. For the first-order condition, results 
showed no significant e!ects (ps>.12, BFInclusion between 0.33 and 2.67). For the second 
order condition, results of the NHST approach showed that accuracy was lower for the YA 
than the OA group (0.75 vs. 0.85), F(1,31) = 4.65, p = .039, !p2 = .13, BFInclusion = 2.15. There 
were no other significant e!ects (ps>.37, BFInclusion between 0.44 and 2.12).
Speed/Accuracy Trade-O!s
To examine if a di!erence in speed/accuracy trade-o!s during performance between the 
two age groups could explain the present findings, we evaluated whether performance as 
reflected in RTs and the proportion of correct responses were correlated within each age 
Figure 3. Individual and mean proportion of correct responses (adjusted for performance in the physical 
control condition) for the a!ective and cognitive ToM components as a function of age group in the first 
order (left) and second order (right) conditions. Error bars represent within-subject standard errors.
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group. For each condition of our design, we performed separate correlation analyses across 
participants in the YA and OA groups. The alpha level was adjusted to p < .00625 to 
Bonferroni correct for the two types of inferences (first vs. second order) multiplied by the 
two ToM components (cognitive vs. a!ective). As Table 2 shows, results of the correlation 
analyses showed no significant correlations in any of the conditions, neither for the YA 
group (all ps>.083, BF10s between 0.33 and 1.20) nor the OA group (all ps>.047, BF10 
s between 0.32 and 1.85). The absence of significant negative correlations between RT and 
the proportion of correct responses argues against the notion of (group di!erences in) 
speed/accuracy trade-o!s during performance and suggests that the observed e!ects of 
aging cannot be explained by age-related di!erences in such trade-o!s.
Discussion
In the present study we examined the e!ect of aging on ToM using a task that di!erentiates 
between cognitive and a!ective ToM components and between first and second order 
inferences. We observed that across first order items OA needed more time to make 
inferences than YA. For the second order items, this age di!erence was more pronounced 
for a!ective than for cognitive ToM. These observations suggest that aging is associated 
with changes in ToM, but that di!erences in e!ects of age between cognitive and a!ective 
ToM are selective to second order inferences. However, we also found some evidence 
supporting age-related improvements on second order inferences when evaluating perfor-
mance in terms of accuracy. As we found no indications for speed/accuracy trade-o!s, it is 
unlikely that this improved accuracy is due to older participants strategically taking more 
time. Combining our findings, we propose that aging is associated with slowing of the 
decision processes underlying ToM inferences, but that the outcome of these processes is 
una!ected in OA.
The asymmetrical slowing of decision processes underlying cognitive versus a!ective 
ToM for second order inferences in older age may be related to the di!erential neural 
substrates underlying these components. Research has shown that cognitive ToM engages 
a network that includes the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), and the dorsal striatum, whereas a!ective ToM engages a network 
that includes the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), the ventral ACC, and the ventral 
striatum (Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Healy & Grossman, 2018). Prior studies have 
shown that within the prefrontal cortex the vmPFC is more sensitive to age-related 
structural changes than the dmPFC (see Kemp, Després, Sellal, & Dufour, 2012). This 
could explain why the OA group in our study showed slower decision making for a!ective 
Table 2. Correlations between performance measures (RT and proportion of correct responses) for each 
of our experimental conditions as a function of Age group.
Young adults Older adults
Condition r p BF10 r p BF10
First order
A!ective ".263 .31 0.49 ".487 .047 1.85
Cognitive ".121 .64 0.33 ".104 .69 0.32
Second order
A!ective .432 .083 1.20 .206 .43 0.40
Cognitive .364 .15 0.78 .338 .18 0.67
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than cognitive second order items. On the other hand, at the functional level, Moran, Jolly, 
and Mitchell (2012) found evidence for age-related reductions in dmPFC activation across 
three social-cognitive paradigms. However, they did not distinguish between cognitive and 
a!ective components of social cognition, which may have obscured more specific findings. 
As prior studies have provided mixed results regarding the patterns of change in the 
aforementioned ToM networks in healthy aging (for reviews, see Kemp et al., 2012; 
Moran, 2013), future studies should exploit neuroimaging and – modulation techniques 
to further address this issue.
While intuitively appealing, such an explanation in terms of cortical changes is admit-
tedly speculative and may be an oversimplification of the mechanism underlying the e!ects 
of aging. First, there are also other areas that are typically found to be associated with ToM, 
in particular the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ; Young, Dodell-Feder, & Saxe, 2010), that 
do not seem to be di!erentially recruited during ToM tasks in older compared to young 
adults (Moran et al., 2012). In addition, one could wonder to what extent the e!ects of aging 
rely on structural (degenerative) changes with age, or whether changes in experiences, 
impulsivity, and hormonal changes, among others, also play a role. For example, the first 
study on ToM in healthy aging reported that ToM performance remains intact and may 
even improve with older age, and proposed that this was related to older adults having more 
wisdom (Happé, Winner, & Brownell, 1998). Our observation of higher accuracy on second 
order inferences in the OA group is in line with this notion, although literature reviews 
concluded that most studies subsequent to Happé et al. (1998) in fact showed age-related 
reductions in ToM performance (Henry et al., 2013; Moran, 2013). As aforementioned, our 
results suggest that the observed age e!ect on accuracy was not related to di!erences in 
performance trade-o!s – however, we acknowledge that this does not conclusively refute 
the possibility that slowing in OA may have benefited the outcome of the decision process in 
a more implicit, non-strategic manner. We also note that for first order inferences the 
absence of a significant age e!ect on accuracy may reflect a ceiling e!ect, because over half 
of the subjects responded correctly on all trials across conditions.2 This may have obscured 
age di!erences in ToM outcomes, and advocates for the inclusion of measures reflecting the 
decision making process (e.g., RTs or eye-tracking) in addition to mere outcome accuracy. 
Future studies could investigate which circumstances modulate the outcome of decision 
making process in OA, such as performing under time pressure. In addition, as recent 
studies found that ToM in older adults can be improved by training (Cavallini et al., 2015; 
Lecce et al., 2019) and by enhancing motivation (Zhang et al., 2019), future studies could 
focus on developing and implementing interventions that can induce compensatory 
mechanisms and/or plasticity for ToM performance in older age.
Methodological Considerations
A strength of the current study is that the Yoni paradigm allowed us to evaluate both 
cognitive and a!ective ToM as well as first and second order inferences within a single 
task. For cognitive ToM, the present finding that aging was associated with changes in 
performance is in line with findings from previous studies that have examined the e!ect of 
healthy aging on ToM components within the same task (Baksh et al., 2018; Bottiroli et al., 
2016; Fischer et al., 2017; Walzak & Loken Thornton, 2018). For a!ective ToM, our 
finding that aging adversely impacted performance is in line with results reported by 
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Fischer et al. (2017) but in contrast with those of Bottiroli et al. (2016). Moreover, we 
further elucidated the e!ect of aging on ToM by considering the type of inference, namely 
first versus second order. Although age di!erences have been more consistently observed 
for second order inferences (Duval et al., 2011; Moran, 2013), we here observed that aging 
slowed decision making on both first and second order inferences. This suggests that the 
Yoni task provides a sensitive measure to identify changes in ToM processing with older 
age, even for first order inferences.
Despite the use of sample size calculations to determine the number of required 
subjects for our study, concerns may arise about whether the small number of subjects 
per age group yielded su"cient power. To evaluate whether our findings may be subject to 
unforeseen power limitations, we compared the magnitudes of age e!ects observed in the 
present study with those observed by Fischer et al. (2017). As our sample size calculations 
were based on t-test e!ect sizes reported in Fischer et al. (2017; cognitive ToM d = 0.75, 
a!ective ToM d = 0.86), we converted the e!ect sizes observed in the present study as 
reflected in !p2 to Cohen’s d (cf. Cohen, 1988; DeCoster, 2012). For RTs, converted e!ect 
sizes of our age factor in the cognitive and a!ective conditions were d = 0.91 and d = 0.95, 
respectively, for first order inferences, and d = 0.85 and d = 1.45, respectively, for second 
order inferences. For accuracy, the converted age main e!ect size in the second order 
condition was d = 0.77 (results showed no significant e!ects of age for first order 
inferences). The comparison thus shows similar magnitudes for age e!ects in the present 
study and Fischer et al. (2017), arguing against the notion that our findings could be the 
result of insu"cient power.
One could argue that the gender di!erence between the YA and OA groups may 
compromise the interpretation of our findings in terms of age e!ects. While there are 
indications that women have better a!ective social cognitive abilities than men (e.g., 
emotion recognition, Hall & Matsumoto, 2004; empathy, Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004), studies specifically investigating ToM have generally reported no 
significant gender di!erences (Frank, Baron-Cohen, & Ganzel, 2015; Pezzuti, 
Longobardi, Milletti, & Ovidi, 2011; Turkstra, Norman, Mutlu, & Du!, 2018). To 
evaluate whether the present findings could reflect gender e!ects, we re-ran our 
analyses with Gender rather than Age as a grouping variable. We found no evidence 
that gender a!ected ToM performance in terms of RTs (first order ps>.29, BFsInclusion 
= 0.45–0.66; second order ps>.34, BFsInclusion = 0.45–0.68) or accuracy (first order 
ps>.054, BFsInclusion = 0.81–1.05; second order ps>.048, BFsInclusion = 0.65–1.60). These 
results, in combination with the literature, render it unlikely that group di!erences in 
gender rather than age underlie the observed e!ects.
There are some aspects to the present study that limit the generalizability of our findings. 
First, our OA group comprised community dwelling adults, leaving open the question of 
how ToM abilities are a!ected in adults with reduced functional independence. Second, 
given that we administered a static visual ToM task, an open question remains whether 
similar findings would be obtained for ToM performance in other modalities, such as verbal 
tasks (cf. Slessor et al., 2007). Furthermore, it should be evaluated if our findings would be 
confirmed in more dynamic naturalistic scenarios, as prior studies on the e!ect of aging on 
empathic abilities showed that context modulated age di!erences (e.g., Rauers, Blanke, & 
Riediger, 2013; Richter & Kunzmann, 2011).
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Conclusions
Overall, the current results corroborate that aging is associated with changes in both 
cognitive and a!ective ToM (cf. Baksh et al., 2018; Fischer et al., 2017; Walzak & 
Loken Thornton, 2018) and further refine our understanding of age di!erences in 
ToM. Specifically, we demonstrate that decision processes underlying ToM inferences 
are slower in older adults, but that this slowing does not a!ect the outcome of the 
decision (i.e., no ToM deficit). Moreover, we show that di!erential e!ects of aging on 
cognitive versus a!ective decision processes are selective to second order inferences. As 
we only compared two age groups, our findings leave open the question of when in the 
lifespan age-related changes in ToM begin and whether the relationship with age is 
linear or not. In addition, future studies should take into account individual di!er-
ences in ToM and how these interact with e!ects of aging, by for example considering 
specific dopaminergic gene profiles that are predictive of ToM (Lackner, Sabbagh, 
Hallinan, Liu, & Holden, 2012; Xia, Wu, & Su, 2012). Longitudinal designs may help 
to investigate these issues. Finally, while our findings elucidate changes in ToM related 
to healthy aging, studies should also evaluate the changes that occur with pathological 
aging. It has been shown that di!erent patterns of change in social cognition (includ-
ing ToM) are associated with di!erent neurodegenerative diseases, depending on the 
neuropathological networks and processes that are a!ected by the disease (Kemp et al., 
2012; Poletti, Enrici, & Adenzato, 2012). However, a systematic investigation of the 
impact of pathological aging on cognitive and a!ective ToM in first versus second 
order inferences is currently still lacking.
Notes
1. As visual inspection of the individual data points in Figure 2 suggested that the observed e!ects 
could potentially be driven by extreme data points, we tested the data for outliers. Grubbs’ test 
indicated that for the OA group, the data points with the longest RT in the first order a!ective 
condition and the second order cognitive condition were outliers. Both data points represented 
the same subject. There were no outliers in the YA group. When repeating the RT analyses 
without the data from the OA subject, we observed the same pattern of results as reported for 
the analyses on all subjects.
2. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. For the second order inferences the 
reasoning of a ceiling a!ect does not apply, because only two subjects (1 YA and 1 OA) 
responded correctly on all trials.
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